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ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE:
THE FATE OF THE MANATEES
REx D. KHANt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE West Indian Manatee, Trichechus manatus, is an herbivorous
aquatic mammal that dwells in shallow coastal waters, estuaries,
and rivers.1 Also known as a sea cow, a manatee resembles a
bloated seal with a bulbous face.2 Currently, only about 1,200 West
Indian Manatees live in and around the waters of Florida. 3 Low
productive rate, loss of habitat, and harmful human activities have
pushed these gentle creatures closer to extinction.4 Further exacer-
bating the problem, cold weather also threatens the survival of this
t J.D., Cornell Law School, 1999. While at Cornell, Mr. Khan served as Man-
aging Editor of the Cornell International Law Journal. Prior to law school, he
attended the University of California at San Diego, and majored in quantitative
economics. Currently, Mr. Khan resides and practices in California.
1. See West Indian Florida Manatee (Trichechus Manatus) (visited Nov. 15, 1999)
<http://www.seacow.com/manatee> (describing manatee as "[g] ray-brown walrus-
shaped sea cow" and listing various items generally describing manatee including
physical description, size, population, reproduction, legal protection, habitat, lon-
gevity, survival threats, conservation, range, behavior, food source, and natural his-
tory). Scientists identify manatees by the scar patterns left on their tails and backs
from collisions with boats and barges. See id. (exploring numerous factors that
threaten survival of manatees, including collisions with boats, harassment from
people, being crushed or drowned in flood control gates, chemical and plastic
pollution, and disease due to cold waters).
2. See id. (detailing that coloration varies in shades from gray to brown and
stating that average adult manatee grows to be ten feet long and normally weighs
about 1,000 pounds, but can weigh as much as 3,000 pounds).
3. See id. (describing "survival threats" to manatee). Only about 1,800 mana-
tees were living in and around the waters of Florida in late 1995. See U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Species Accounts of the West Indian Manatee (visited Feb. 12, 2000)
<http://www.endangered.fws.gov/i/a/saa0c.html>.
4. See West Indian Florida Manatee, supra note 1 (listing disease resulting from
cold weather as survival threat); see alsoJ. M. PACKARD ET AL., FLORIDA COOPERATIVE
FISH & WILDLIFE RESEARCH UNIT, REPORT No. 8, MANATEE RESPONSE TO INTER-
RUPTED OPERATION OF THE FT. MYERS PLANT (1995) (discussing various threats to
manatees' survival); Species Accounts of the West Indian Manatee, supra note 3 (ex-
plaining reasons for current status of manatees as endangered species). In the
18th and 19th centuries, the manatee population was most likely more abundant
than today, with initial population decreases resulting from over-harvesting for
meat, oil, and leather. Manatee deaths have increased steadily. See id. (highlight-
ing that mortalities from collisions with boats have increased from 21 percent of all
deaths in 1976 to 29 percent in the time period from 1986 to 1991). The combina-
tion of high mortality rates and low reproductive rates have led to serious doubts
about the species' ability to survive in the United States. See id. (commenting that
deaths of dependent calves have increased from 14 percent to 24 percent).
(31)
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federally-listed endangered species. 5 During unusually cold win-
ters, when the water temperature drops below a manatee's cold-tol-
erance threshold, the manatee is likely to die of cold stress.6
Attracted to warm-water environments, manatees tend to con-
gregate around twenty-four warm-water havens in the rivers of Flor-
ida during winter seasons. 7 Of these twenty-four havens, many are
artificially created by human technology. Several Florida electric
power companies use nearby river water to cool their plants and
discharge warm-water effluents as a by-product. Gradually, many
manatees have become dependent upon these artificial warm-water
refuges. 8
Over time, the warm-water effluents have played a crucial role
in helping the manatee population to recover. By providing and
maintaining the warm-water sanctuaries, power plants help mana-
tee calves survive harsh winters and mature into fruitful members of
the herd. Without the warm-water discharges, many young mana-
tees, being particularly vulnerable to cold stress, would have per-
ished during unusually cold winter months. For endangered
species, if the birth rate falls below the death rate, extinction will
result.
5. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (h) (1980) (listing West Indian Manatee as among en-
dangered species); see also Species Accounts of the West Indian Manatee, supra note 3
(describing warm-water havens in Florida as gathering spots for manatees). The
manatee migrates to warm-water havens, such as natural springs and areas artifi-
cially created by humans, when the temperature falls below 21 or 22 degrees Centi-
grade. See id. If the manatee does not have access to these warm-water havens
during severe cold fronts, then the manatee may die. See id.
6. See PAcKARD, supra note 4 (discussing manatees' use of habitat created by
Florida power plants). Cold stress occurs when the manatee cannot produce
enough metabolic heat to compensate for the drop in water temperature. See id.
Once the manatee's fat reserve is depleted, the manatee becomes lethargic and
refuses to eat. See id. Eventually, it will die of malnutrition. See id.
7. See id. (discussing dependence of manatee on man-made warm-water
havens in Florida); see also Species Accounts of the West Indian Manatee, supra note 3
(noting that "[dluring the winter months, the United States' manatee population
confines itself to the coastal waters of the southern half of peninsular Florida and
to springs and warm water outfalls as far north as southeast Georgia").
8. See Patrick M. Rose, Manatees and the Future of Electric Utilities Deregulation in
Florida, SIRENEWS (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, Washington, D.C.) Oct. 1997, at 1 (describing role warm-water sanc-
tuaries have had preserving Florida manatees). Power plants help manatee calves
survive harsh winters and mature into fruitful members of the herd by providing
and maintaining warm-water sanctuaries. See PACKARD, supra note 4 (explaining
that many young manatees would have perished during unusually cold winter
months without existence of warm-water sanctuaries artificially created by indus-
trial plants). Because of the distribution of the warm-water havens throughout
coastal Florida, the manatees have extended their "winter range and cushioned
what would have been much greater losses during times of extreme cold." Rose,
supra, at 1.
[Vol. XI: p. 31
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THE FATE OF THE MANATEES
Unfortunately for the manatees, many of their man-made
warm-water refuges might be lost in the near future. Recently, the
federal government has provided the means to deregulate the util-
ity industry, and Florida may soon choose to privatize its electric
industry.9 The goal of this deregulation is to increase the level of
competition among the new private utility providers, and thereby
benefit the local residents with lower utility rates. 10 Increased com-
petition, however, could force some inefficient plants to go out of
9. See Jeff B. Slaton, Searching for "Green" Electrons in a Deregulated Electricity Mar-
ket: How Green is Green?, 22 ENVIRONS ENVrL. L. & POL'YJ. 21, 24-25 (1998) (ex-
plaining steps taken by federal government enabling deregulation movement).
Prior to the 1970s, the U.S. electric industry consisted of a system of carefully regu-
lated monopolies. See id. at 24. Responding to the energy crisis of the late 1970s,
Congress enacted the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), which al-
lowed energy providers to purchase power from "qualifying facilities" that relied
on renewable energy sources. See id.; see also Public Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3201-11, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-4, 2601-45, 42 U.S.C. § 6808, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2001-12
(1994)). This was the first step toward deregulation. See Slaton, supra, at 24. In
1992, Congress continued the move toward deregulation when it enacted the En-
ergy Policy Act, which exempted certain "wholesale generators" from the strict fed-
eral requirements. See id. With the passage of the Energy Policy Act, a competitive
market for electricity began to develop. See id. Then, in 1996, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) passed the "open access rule." See id. at 25. The
"open access rule" allows electricity producers to use the utilities' transmission
lines to reach consumers. See id. Thus, electricity producers are able to contact
consumers directly and compete for their business. See id. Although this federal
scheme provides for nationwide deregulation, the monopoly franchises granted to
utilities were from the states. See Christine Garcia, A Future of Green Power: Impacts of
the Electric Utility Deregulation in America, 10 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 225, 225-26
(1998) (explaining system of state-granted monopoly franchises to utility compa-
nies). Therefore, the states have been left to choose whether or not to deregulate
their electricity industries. See id. at 226 (stating that "[s]tate by state, legislatures
are deciding that it is time for a change in the utility industry"). Several states have
already passed legislation which has deregulated their energy industries. See Rose,
supra note 8, at 2 (noting that California, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and
Texas were among the states already beginning power deregulation). But see
Douglas L. Heinold, Retail Wheeling: Is Competition Among Energy Utilities an Environ-
mental Disaster, or Can It Be Reconciled With Integrated Resource Planning, 22 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 301, 332-33 (1996) (suggesting that because of environ-
mental concerns, deregulation of utility industry may not occur nationwide, or
may take longer than previously anticipated).
10. See Heinold, supra note 9, at 332-33 (citing deregulation of telephone in-
dustry as being analogous to deregulation of utility industry). The deregulation of
the utility industry will be much more complicated and far less certain than the
deregulation of the telephone industry. See id. Reliability of service for utility cus-
tomers may be compromised due to the uncertainties surrounding the upkeep of
the network transmissions. See id. (discussing drawbacks of power deregulation
and claiming that larger power customers, such as factories and businesses, are real
supporters of move towards deregulation). The underlying premise of the state-
ment that the goal of deregulation is to increase competition in order to benefit
residents is that public utility plants are run by bureaucratic agencies and, more
often than not, those who head the agencies owe their positions to their constitu-
ents and interest groups. Thus, the decision-making processes of running the
2000]
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business; if the closed plants are not taken over by other power
companies, then the resulting loss of warm-water shelters could be
permanent.1 1 Such a loss could be detrimental to the highly-endan-
gered Florida manatees.
Once deregulated, the new private owners will take public pol-
icy considerations (such as environmental conservation) less seri-
ously.12 Beholden only to the consumers they serve, the privatized
plants will be governed by purely economic considerations. For ex-
ample, if a plant owner decides that it would be cheaper to buy
electricity from another plant during a particular winter season, he
will simply shut down his plant without considering whether the
manatees will need the warm-water effluents that winter.
The fact that plant owners tend to base their decisions largely
upon economic interests, however, does not necessarily mean that
the owners will never consider the welfare of the manatees. Eco-
nomic interests of plant owners tie such owners to consumers. It is
possible that a group of consumers may feel that it is cruel to de-
prive the manatees of their warm-water havens. These consumers
plants often involve political considerations, such as public opinions. Private
plants, on the other hand, tend to be less constrained by public interests.
11. See Rose, supra note 8, at 3 (asserting that utility companies which have
benefitted economically from discharging warm water, upon which manatees have
come to depend, should be forced to provide alternatives for manatees if utility
companies close any plants for financial reasons).
12. See id. at 2. The author describes such an event involving the FLP Ft.
Meyers (Tice) power plant. See id. The author states:
Apparently the executives at FLP had decided (without consultation with
their own environmental staff) that since they could buy power cheaper
from Georgia, they would not run the Tice power plant. Needless to say
we did what was necessary to avert what would have been a major catastro-
phe by getting Governor Graham to intervene with the President of FLP,
who agreed to run the plant temporarily even though it would be more
expensive to operate the plant than to purchase more power.
Id.
In addition, the introduction of power utility competition can be reconciled
with the protection of the environment if environmental costs and manatee pro-
tection costs are calculated into "stranded costs projections." See id. at 3 (defining
stranded costs as "essentially the difference between the actual cost of a long-term
asset, such as a power plant, and the current market value of that asset"). In order
to ensure manatee protection, utility companies must calculate environmental
safeguards and obligations into the cost of deregulation. See id. (commenting that
existing utility companies will attempt to recover costs of transition from regulated
to competitive process from customers).
As a further note, deregulation of the utility industry has sparked the concerns
of environmentalists in a variety of other areas. See, e.g., Michael Evan Stern &
Margaret M. Mlynczak Stern, A Critical Overview of the Economic and Environmental
Consequences of the Deregulation of the U.S. Electric Power Industry, 4 ENVTL. LAw. 79
(1997) (discussing several potential environmental drawbacks to deregulation);
Garcia, supra note 9, at 228-30 (discussing increased use of fossil fuels and harm to
ozone layer as result of deregulation).
[Vol. XI: p. 31
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may threaten to boycott the plant if the owner does not operate the
plant during the winter. In theory, if this boycott is likely to result,
then a plant owner will consider the welfare of the manatees when
deciding whether to shut down the plant.' 3
In practice, however, the above boycott scenario is not likely to
occur. The manatee-loving consumers face a "collective action"
problem: although individual consumers may wish to protect the
manatee, the high cost of getting all these individuals together and
organizing an effective boycott campaign may prevent them from
acting out their wishes. For the campaign to be effective, the
number of participants must be sufficiently high. Consumers will
be deterred from boycotting, however, because organizing a high
number of participants correlates to a high collective-action cost.
The point is this: once privatized, power plant owners are less likely
to consider the welfare of the manatees.1 4
Where technology has altered the natural environment to such
an extent that the survival of indigenous species has become depen-
dent on the man-made habitat, do we have a duty to maintain the
existence of that technology? Part II of this Article explores the
question of whether we have a moral obligation to maintain the
artificial sanctuaries for the sake of the manatees.1 5 Part III dis-
cusses whether the government has a legal duty to save the mana-
tees when it deregulates the utility industry. 16 Part IV examines the
constitutional limitations on the government's actions to protect
13. For example, if a plant owner decides that it would be cheaper to buy
electricity from another plant during a particular winter season, then he will sim-
ply shut down his plant without considering whether the manatees will need the
warm water effluents that winter. Business constituents would favor such a deci-
sion because increased efficiency results in increased profit. Constituents of the
government, on the other hand, tend to have broader concerns because the effi-
ciency of the government is less visible and often felt only through cut-programs
designed to reallocate funds or through taxes which mask the source of less effi-
cient management.
It is feasible that a plant owner could be motivated to preserve these habitats
by his own convictions. This is unlikely, although, in that directors who operate a
business have a duty to pursue the best interests of that business. Since a business
is largely defined by the profit-seeking motivations of its members, economic con-
cerns will likely outweigh non-economic concerns.
14. See Rose, supra note 8, at 3 (claiming that, unless action is taken soon,
deregulation of Florida's power companies will be extremely detrimental to mana-
tees' survival, despite the manatees' "endangered" classification). It has been
urged that environmental safeguards and steps necessary to protect the manatee
should be integrated with any future utility deregulation plan in Florida. See id.
15. For a discussion of the moral obligation, if any, to protect the manatees,
see infra notes 18-58 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of whether the government has a legal duty to protect the
manatees after deregulation, see infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
2000]
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the manatees. 17 Finally, this Article concludes that, ultimately, the
state of scientific advancement may determine the fate of the
manatees.
II. MORAL OBLIGATION
Given its subjective nature, a comprehensive discussion of mo-
rality is beyond the scope of this Article.18 To simplify matters, let
us initially assume that there are only two types of people who care
about the manatees: libertarians and egalitarians. After introduc-
ing the libertarians and the egalitarians, we will then consider a
third group, the utilitarians.
A. Libertarianism
A legal scholar once described libertarians as "solitary sef-in-
terested selves drifting about pursuing their own projects, seeing
other people either as instruments of their purposes or threats to
their security." 19 The scholar then proceeded to say that, "[i] n this
fantasy of predatory paranoiacs, formal contracting represents the
only safe way for people to associate with one another. Contracts
are those carefully circumscribed interactions in which these soli-
tary beings briefly join together for an alienated moment of mutual
exploitation." 20 Notwithstanding his cynical tone, the scholar cor-
rectly identified the two essential tenets of libertarianism: sphere of
autonomy and freedom of contract.
21
17. For a discussion of the constitutional limits on the government's actions
to protect the manatees, see infra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
18. For a more complete analysis of morality, see RIcHARD GARNER, BEYOND
MORALITY (ETHICS AND ACTION) (1994) (providing thorough history of east and
west religions and their moral concepts).
19. Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 195, 207 (1987) (describing metaphysical libertarianism as
"classical contract law's neo-Hobbesian nightmare images of the society of atomis-
tic individuals"); see also SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSO-
PHY 218 (1994) (defining metaphysical libertarianism as "[a] view that seeks to
protect the reality of human free will by supposing that a free choice is not causally
determined but not random either").
20. Gordon, supra note 19, at 207. The author observed that it is unusual that
the traditional notion of contracting has come to define how people deal with one
another despite the fact that members of communities (business and otherwise)
interact with one another day in and day out, establishing relationships and con-
ventions that govern their dealings outside the bounds of contract. See id.
21. See id. at 198 (advancing Critical Legal Studies (CLS) theory of law and
criticizing traditional methods of teaching law as depicting "an idealized fantasy of
order according to which legal rules and procedures have so structured relations
among people that such relations may primarily be understood as instituted by
their consent, their free and rational choices"). According to Gordon, CLS began
as a crusade consisting mainly of law professors, but also included some practition-
[Vol. XI: p. 31
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1. Political Libertarianism
Libertarians believe that every person is encapsulated by a
sphere of autonomy that protects his life, liberty, and property in-
terests.2 2 Libertarians value this sphere of autonomy so much that
they would forbid a government from intruding upon the sphere,
even if a majority of the people would benefit from the intrusion. 23
In other words, the sanctity of the sphere of autonomy transcends
the common good.24 Accordingly, libertarians would despise all
forms of unearned benefit that a government bestows upon a needy
person at the expense of the creator of that benefit.25 To the liber-
tarians, when a government coercively takes away a benefit from the
creator and redistributes that benefit to someone who did not earn
it, the government is breaching the creator's sphere of autonomy
and infringing upon his property rights. 26
ers to express their extreme dissatisfaction with their own legal education. See id.
at 196. Advocates of CLS seek to "transform the practices of the legal system to
help make this a more decent, equal, solidary society." Id. at 197. Libertarianism
is thus in conformity with CLS because of the spirits of autonomy and freedom
embodied in both philosophies.
22. See, e.g.,JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 7 (1988) (stating that liber-
tarianism "is the doctrine that the only relevant consideration in political matters is
individual liberty: that there is a delimitable sphere of action for each person, the
person's 'rightful liberty,' such that one may be forced to do or refrain from what
one wants to do only if what one would do or not do would violate, or at least
infringe, the rightful liberty of some other person(s)"); see also BLAcKBURN, supra
note 19, at 218 (defining political libertarianism as advocating "maximization of
individual rights, especially those connected with the operation of a free market,
and the minimizing of the role of the state"). Libertarianism holds that no other
outside forces may have an impact on the individual without his consent. See
NARVESON, supra, at 7.
23. See NARVESON, supra note 22, at 8 (explaining that petitions to uphold
.absolute good," where no one has free choice or autonomy to decide what that
.good" is, are disregarded). As a result, a liberal must justify his policies and be-
liefs that affect other individuals as what is best for these individuals according to
the liberal. See id. (describing method used by liberals to justify imposing their
policies on others).
24. Cf BLAcKBuRN, supra note 19, at 218 (stating that "[i]n politics, libertari-
ans advocate the maximization of individual rights.., and the minimization of the
role of the state"). This means that even if the government exercises its power for
the benefit of the common good, this results in an infringement on the rights of
others. See id.
25. See, e.g., NoRMAN P. BARRY, ON CLASsICAL LIBERALISM AND LIBERTARIANISM
5 (1987) (explaining that libertarians hold "external moral principles [e.g., equita-
ble distribution of income] that are used to validate the redistribution of incomes
away from those who create them simply validates the immoral seizure of legiti-
mately acquired property").
26. See BLAcKmuRN, supra note 19, at 218 (stating that "[iun the libertarian
vision, exercises of state power for positive ends, such as amelioration of social
disadvantage through social welfare programmes, constitute infringements of the
rights of others") (emphasis added). Libertarians believe the government should
merely maintain the status quo and provide order. See id. (declaring that state
2000]
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2. Economic Libertarianism
Libertarians realize that a person who lives in a society cannot
exist solely within his protective sphere of autonomy. To interact
with others, a person must connect his sphere with another per-
son's sphere. 27 Once connected, these two individuals can then ex-
change or redefine their respective rights vis-i-vis one another.
Libertarians establish and enforce these connections via private
contracts. 28 Given their preference for maximum liberty, libertari-
ans believe that people should be free to enter into private con-
tract, without interference from others.29
Consistent with their emphasis on the freedom of contract, in
the economic realm, libertarians follow the laissez faire principles
of neoclassical economics.A0 Accordingly, they believe that the
overall welfare of the market would best be served if each individual
should only support public services not springing from free market). Cf CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISES: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1-2 (1981)
(discussing role of private contracts in society). Fried states:
Security of the person, stability of property, and the obligation of contract
[form] the bases of a civilized society.... The law of property defines the
boundaries of our rightful possessions, while the law of torts seeks to
make us whole against violations of those boundaries, as well as against
violations of the natural boundaries of our physical person. Contract law
ratifies and enforces our joint ventures beyond those bounda-
ries .... [T]he will theory of contract, which sees contractual obligations
as essentially self-imposed, is a fair implication of liberal individualism.
Id.
27. See Charles Murray, What It Means to Be a Libertarian, Address Before an
American Experiment Luncheon Forum (Jan. 17, 1997), in CENTER OF THE AMERI-
CAN EXPERIMENT (Minneapolis, Minn.) June 1997, at 4 (discussing importance of
communities in people's lives). People in communities can influence and have an
impact on other people's lives. See id. at 3 (commenting on source of satisfaction
that communities provide); see also BARRY, supra note 25, at 4 (stating that "each
individual ... will exchange with his fellow men so as to advance the values of
each").
28. See CHARLES MuRRAY, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A LIBERTARIAN: A PERSONAL
INTERPRETATION 24-25 (1998) (stating that "[e]conomic freedom is crucial, first,
because you cannot restrict economic freedom without also restricting other ex-
pressions of freedom.... Economic freedom is important also because it naturally
restricts the power of the government .... Apart from these considerations, eco-
nomic freedom is indispensable because it makes a free society workable").
29. "Laissez faire" is French for "allow to act" and expresses "a political-eco-
nomic philosophy of the government of allowing the market-place to operate rela-
tively free of restrictions and intervention." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (6th ed.
1990). For a discussion of neoclassical economics, see infra notes 30-32 and ac-
companying text.
30. See IRWIN EDMAN, FOUNTAINHEADS OF FREEDOM: THE GROWTH OF THE DEM-
OCRATIC IDEAL 106-07 (1941) (stating that "[l]ibertarians... developed a theory of
the unfettered economic man, buying and selling in a free market ... trusted to
enlightened and unrestricted self-interest on the part of each to work out a har-
mony that would redound to the good of all").
[Vol. XI: p. 31
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economic entity is free to maximize its own profits without govern-
ment interference. 31 Stated otherwise, unfettered competition
among the firms will lead to a healthy economy.3 2 A corollary of
this "perfect competition" doctrine is that firms which are too weak
to compete with others should disappear from the economy so that
more efficient firms may take their places to compete for scarce
resources.
3. Environmental Libertarianism
To some people, the term "libertarian environmentalist" may
seem like an oxymoron. These people think that because libertari-
ans place a heavy emphasis on individual private rights, it follows
then that libertarians must not care about common public goods,
such as the environment.3 3 Although this observation may be accu-
rate in many situations, it is not always correct. According to the
principles of logic, for a statement to be true, the contra-positive of
that statement must also be true.34 Hence, for the statement "if you
value private rights, then you do not care about public goods" to be
true all the time, the statement "if you care about public goods,
then you do not value private rights" must also be true all the time.
Given that the latter sentence is not always true, it is, therefore,
possible for a libertarian to be an environmentalist.
Not only is it possible for a libertarian to be an environmental-
ist, it is also possible to apply the libertarian philosophy to environ-
mental conservation. Both libertarian philosophy and environ-
mental conservation are governed by the same power structure: the
regulator regulates the regulated. In politics, the regulators are the
elected governments, and the regulated are the citizens. In the
economy, the regulators are the bureaucrats, and the regulated are
the firms. In the environment, the regulators are the humans,
31. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 297 (David W. Pearce
ed., 3d ed. 1986) (explaining that "[t]he idea of a perfectly competitive economy
in equilibrium . . . is central to the neo-classical scheme").
32. See BLAcKBURN, supra note 19, at 218 (describing libertarian perspective
that "[t]he state is confined to a 'night-watchman' role of maintaining order and
providing only those public services that will not arise spontaneously through the
free market"); see also ROBERT NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 27 (Basic
Books, Inc. 1974) (describing "night-watchman" as being "redistributive to the ex-
tent that it compels some people to pay for the protection of others").
33. See Can Free Markets and Environmental Interests Coexist? (visited Mar. 22,
2000) <http://libertarianism.about.com/newsissues/libertarianism/library/
weekly> (refuting critics and asserting that free market and environmental inter-
ests can coexist).
34. For example, for the statement "if X then Y" to be true, the statement "if
not Y then not X" must also be true.
20001
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and the regulated are the animals.
i REGU TkOR Governments Bureaucrats Humans
REcULATE Citizens Firms Animals
Regardless of who plays the role of the regulator or the regulated,
the libertarian rule of regulation remains the same: the regulator is
a minimalist "night-watchman '35 who will intervene only to ensure
that the regulated do not infringe upon each other's rights. 3 6
To illustrate how the libertarian philosophy applies to environ-
mental conservation, let us assume that a special breed of dolphins
shares the same rivers with the manatees, and that the artificial
thermal discharge is killing a kind of fish upon which the dolphins
depend for survival. Consistent with their political view, libertarian
environmentalists would argue that, although the manatees have a
right to exist, the manatees should not exist at the expense of the
dolphins. Libertarian environmentalists would abhor any form of
unearned benefit that humans (qua regulator) bestow upon the
manatees (a regulated entity) at an undeserved cost to the dolphins
(another regulated entity) 3
35. See NozICK, supra note 32, at 333-34 (explaining libertarian perception of
proper role of government as "a minimal state"). Nozick describes the perfect
minimal state as follows:
The minimal state treats us as inviolate individuals, who may not be
used in certain ways by others as means or tools or instruments or re-
sources; it treats us as persons having individual rights with the dignity
this constitutes. Treating us with respect by respecting our rights, it al-
lows us, individually or with whom we choose, to choose our life and to
realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided
by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dig-
nity. How dare any state or group of individuals do more. Or less.
Id.
36. See BARRY, supra note 25, at 5 (discussing economic libertarianism). The
maintaining of technologically-altered environments is somewhat like a subsidy or
affirmative action program that benefits the manatees but harms the dolphins.
Libertarians do not support subsidies and affirmative action programs that shift
equity in such a way, and they would likely not support the maintaining of these
environments for similar reasons. See id. (discussing libertarian perspective per-
taining to affirmative action programs and subsidies).
37. For a detailed discussion on how economic principles apply to environ-
mental management, see Michael Rothschild, Economy as Ecosystem, in THE LIBERTA-
RIAN READER 243-47 (David Boaz ed., The Free Press 1997) (arguing that
economists were wrong when they wed mechanical concepts from Newtonian phys-
ics instead of evolutionary ideas from Darwin's biology).
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Applying their view of economics, libertarian environmentalists
believe that if wild animals (the regulated) are allowed to compete
freely for survival without meddling from humans (the regulator),
then the environment will be at its healthiest. 38 Through unfet-
tered competition, animals that are too weak to compete with
others would disappear from the environment, leaving the stronger
creatures to compete for scarce resources. Libertarian environ-
mentalists would agree with Darwin that "all nature is at war; the
strongest ultimately prevail, the weakest fail." 39
These environmentalists would also point out that when
humans interfere with nature's "perfect competition" ecosystem,
they distort the state of nature and introduce harmful externalities
into the environment. 40 For instance, when artificial warm-water
pools cause manatees to congregate in large numbers, the aquatic
vegetation in those areas cannot adequately support this unnatural
concentration of manatees. 41 The cost of this over-consumption
will be borne by the adolescent manatees. Compared to adult man-
atees, adolescent manatees are less efficient grazers and, therefore,
are more vulnerable to starvation. Without the adolescent mana-
tees to replace the aging manatees, their population will decline.
38. CHARLES DARWIN, THE VARIATION OF ANIMALS AND PLANTS UNDER DOMESTI-
CATION 6-7 (1896). This theory is a recapitulation of Darwin's survival of the fittest.
See id. It holds that the strong members of a species will dominate the environ-
ment and survive, thus eliminating the weaker members. See id. This is ultimately
a part of Darwin's theory of evolution, which holds that natural species must adapt
and evolve in order to survive in a changing environment. See id. Those that do
not adapt will die and become extinct. See id.; see also Rothschild, supra note 37, at
246 (stating that "[i] nefficiency is punished by extinction"). If the species (or even
an industry) is truly fit to survive, then it will separate from the rest of its species
and evolve into an "even more specialized offshoot." See id.
39. JESSE DUKENMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 38-39 (2d ed. 1988) (ex-
plaining notion of "externalities"). The authors state:
Externalities exist whenever some person, say X, makes a decision about
how to use resources without taking full account of the effects of the deci-
sion. X ignores some of the effects - some of the costs or benefits that
would result from a particular activity, for example - because they fall
on others. They are 'external' to X, hence the label externalities.
Id. For a detailed discussion of externalities, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory
of Property Rights, LAW AND ECONOMICS 247-59 (Richard A. Posner & Francesco Par-
isi eds., 1997). When externalities exist, a resource will not be used in a way that is
beneficial to the species as a whole. See DUKENMINIER & KRIER, supra, at 39. Such a
misuse of a resource can potentially be detrimental to a species. See id.
40. See Power Plants: Good or Bad for Manatees?, SIRENEWS (International Union
for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1998,
at 5 (explaining that because food source cannot adequately support manatee pop-
ulation, weaker members of group will be eliminated through starvation).
41. See id.
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Eventually, this negative population growth rate will result in
extinction.
Unnatural aggregation poses another problem. Those warm-
water areas have historically high incidences of a fatal phenomenon
called the "red tide. ' 42 As red tide organisms release deadly toxins
into the water and air, an unusually large number of manatees
would be killed at once. 43 This lack of habitat diversification could
be detrimental to the survival of the manatees as a whole.
In sum, when humans inject technology into nature, humans
create harmful externalities that lead to detrimental consequences.
Libertarian environmentalists, therefore, would be in favor of re-
moving human technology from the environment. Consistent with
their political and economic views, libertarian environmentalists be-
lieve that the best way to manage the environment is to minimize
human intervention.
B. Egalitarianism
1. Political Egalitarianism
In terms of the regulator-regulated framework set forth above,
egalitarians believe that regulations "should be aimed at respecting
and advancing the equality of persons."44 To achieve equality, regu-
lators must observe two principles: (1) the equal opportunity princi-
ple and (2) the difference principle.45 The equal opportunity
42. See id. The natural phenomenon of red tide kills manatees in two ways.
See id. First, while the manatees graze the sea grass beds, they are poisoned when
they ingest large numbers of sea squirts, which feed on the toxic red tide orga-
nisms. See id. Second, the manatees could also be poisoned by airborne toxins
released by red tide organisms when the manatees breathe at the water's surface.
See id.
43. See id. (addressing impact of red tide on manatee); see also DARWIN, supra
note 38, at 54-57 (describing how horses adapt to their ever-changing environ-
ment). Thus, diverse environments allow animals to develop different tactics to
better ensure continuation of the species in the environment. See id. at 54; see also
Rothschild, supra note 37, at 246 (stating that "[l]acking any grand design other
than the urge to escape threats to their continued existence, genes and technology
spontaneously weave living webs of ever more-intricate filigree").
44. BLAcKBuRN, supra note 19, at 114 (emphasis added).
45. SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 75 (1971). The difference principle
is a strongly egalitarian concept. See id. at 76. Unless the distribution improves the
position of both persons to a transaction, an equal distribution is to be preferred.
See id. To illustrate the difference principle:
Consider the distribution of income among social classes. Let us suppose
that the various income groups correlate with representative individuals
by reference to whose expectation we can judge the distribution. Now
those starting out as members of the entrepreneurial class in property-
owning democracy, say, have a better prospect than those who begin in
the class of unskilled laborers. It seems likely that this will be true even
[Vol. XI: p. 31
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principle not only forbids formal cast systems and class barriers, but
also requires affirmative action by the regulator to give the regu-
lated a reasonably equal chance to compete for the rewards of
life.4 6 The difference principle requires the regulator to maximize
the position of the worst-off segment or poorest class in society.47
Egalitarians believe that, where a person is lucky enough to be
born into an advantageous "original position," such a person has no
moral claim to those advantages because it was mere luck.48 There-
fore, it would not be unfair to take away some of those unearned
advantages in order to benefit those who are less fortunate. 49 In
furtherance of this end, egalitarians formulate their rule of regula-
tion this way: the regulator is a micro-manager who should actively
intervene in the affairs of the regulated to achieve equality.
2. Economic Egalitarianism
Because egalitarians prefer an active welfare state, in the eco-
nomic realm, they would practice Keynesian economics. Unlike the
neoclassical view that the economy works best when left alone,
Keynesian theory holds that, for an economy to grow steadily, it is
when the social injustices which now exist are removed. What, then, can
possiblyjustify this kind of mutual inequality in life prospects? According
to the difference principle, it is justifiable only if the difference in expec-
tation is to the advantage of the representative man who is worse off, in
this case the representative unskilled worker.
Id. at 78.
In other words, the disadvantaged must use the expectation as an advanta-
geous incentive. See id. This breeds innovation. See id. It is evident that the role of
fair opportunity is to ensure pure procedural justice via a system of cooperation.
See id. at 87. In pure procedural justice, there is no independent criterion for the
fight result. See id. at 86. It establishes a fair procedure, which in turn ensures a
fair result, provided that the procedure is closely followed. See id. The result is
that the distribution of advantages is not assessed by viewing the benefits available
with the given desires and needs. See id. at 88. Allotment takes place according to
the designed rules. See id.
46. See Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Dis-
tributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 879 (1976) (describing government as regula-
tor and comparing theories of John Rawls and Robert Nozick).
47. See id. at 879-80 (basing principle on egalitarian notions of equal access
and equal benefit). The difference principle essentially holds that the government
must not distribute income and wealth in such a way as to give the poorest segment
of society "more in the long run than they would have had under complete equal-
ity." Id. at 880.
48. See id. at 883-84 (defining "original position" as "people [who] have the
scarce talents or skills which attract high incomes through accidents of nature or
social circumstances, and it is unjust to let accident produce unequal rewards"); see
also RAwLs, supra note 45, at 72 (discussing influence of arbitrary factors which
result in some individuals receiving benefits which they do not deserve).
49. See Grey, supra note 46, at 883-84 (arguing that restrictions on obtaining
and use of property are permissible in morally just society).
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vital for the government to intervene in the marketplace. 50 By ad-
justing the levels of expenditure and taxation, ceteris paribus, 51 a gov-
ernment can manipulate the level of aggregate demand in the
economy, thereby ensuring a steady economic growth. 52
3. Environmental Egalitarianism
Given their political emphasis on equality, egalitarian environ-
mentalists approach environmental management in two ways. First,
consistent with the equal opportunity principle, egalitarian environ-
mentalists argue that all creatures ought to have an equal opportu-
nity to compete for survival. Second, consistent with the difference
principle, egalitarian environmentalists would argue that the pro-
tection of endangered species takes precedence over the welfare of
non-endangered animals. Thus, in the dolphin example above,
egalitarian environmentalists would interfere with the natural envi-
ronment to give the manatees an equal opportunity to survive. 53
Moreover, because the endangered manatees are worse off than the
non-endangered dolphins, egalitarian environmentalists would save
the manatees even if it means that some dolphins would perish as a
result.
Applying their Keynesian "managed economy" model to na-
ture, egalitarian environmentalists would endorse active human
management to protect endangered species. In the case of mana-
tees, by adjusting the water temperature, ceteris paribus, humans can
manipulate the aggregate rate of cold-related fatalities, thereby en-
suring the survival of this endangered animal.
C. Utilitarianism
Ultimately, whether we feel morally obligated to save the mana-
tee depends on where we stand in the spectrum of philosophical
attitudes, with the libertarians on one extreme and the egalitarians
50. See MIT DICrIONARY, supra note 31, at 226-29 (discussing egalitarianism).
Keynesian economics is a system of macroeconomic theory developed by John
Maynard Keynes. See id.
51. Economists use the pedantic Latin phrase "ceteris paribus" to mean "hold-
ing all else constant" or "other things being equal."
52. For example, if the economy is growing too fast (which results in infla-
tion), the government can artificially depress the aggregate demand in the econ-
omy by increasing taxation and decreasing public expenditure, thereby cooling
down an over-heated economy. On the other hand, if the economy is stagnating
(which could lead to a depression), the government can increase the aggregate
demand by cutting taxes and pumping money into the economy through public
expenditure, thereby stimulating a sluggish economy.
53. For a discussion of the general concept of egalitarianism, see supra notes
44-52 and accompanying text.
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on the other. As demonstrated above, libertarians will almost al-
ways opt to let nature take its course. 54 Egalitarians, on the other
hand, will almost always choose to intervene in the natural environ-
ment. In between these two extremes, many other views exist re-
garding one's moral obligation vis-d-vis environmental
conservation. One such view is utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism recognizes that man serves two masters: plea-
sure and pain. For a utilitarian, the goal of any society is to maxi-
mize the total pleasure by minimizing pain. 55 In terms of the
regulator-regulated model above, wherever regulation goes, en-
forcement and punishment follow. Because enforcement and pun-
ishment involve pain, a regulator should not regulate unless it
produces good consequences that outweigh the bad. 56 Stated an-
other way, utilitarians believe that a regulation has no place in soci-
ety unless the benefit of living under such regulation outweighs the
cost thereby incurred. 5 7
Given their emphasis on maximum happiness, utilitarians will
choose to save the manatees only if the pleasure (benefit) of doing
54. For a discussion of libertarianism, see supra notes 19-43 and accompany-
ing text.
55. See BLAcKuBuRN, supra note 19, at 388 (stating utilitarian doctrine); see also
RAwLs, supra note 45, at 22 (describing classical utilitarianism as "society (being]
rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as
to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals
belonging to it") (relying on HENRY SEDGEWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (7th ed.
1907)); GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 491-501 (1995)
(describing utilitarianism and its founder, Jeremy Bentham). The authors state:
Expressed simply, Utilitarianism espouses the view that the greatest
good is the proper measure of right and wrong and the only proper end
of government. Bentham believed that pain and pleasure could be mea-
sured in strictly quantitative terms. Thus the process of making ethical
and social decisions could be reduced to a quasi-mathematical science.
Bentham's "hedonic calculus" would enable moral decisions to be made
on quantitative rather than impressionistic evidence.
Id. at 491.
56. See RAwLS, supra note 45, at 24 (commenting that "U]ust as an individual
balances present and future gain against present and future losses, no society may
balance satisfaction and dissatisfaction between different individuals"); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 46 (1999)
(noting that for utilitarians, "the goal of a society should be to maximize average
utility, or total utility, or wealth, or freedom, or equality or some combination of
these things"). When a society desires to move forward, it must consider the wel-
fare of the group as a whole to advance the desires of all its members. See RAwLs,
supra note 45, at 23-24.
57. See RAWLS, supra note 45, at 24 (stating that "Social Justice is the principle
of rational prudence applied to an aggregative conception of the welfare of the
group"). Only those regulations which produce the most good, or at least as much
good as the other available alternatives, can truly benefit society as a whole. See id.
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so outweighs its pain (cost).58 On the benefit side of the equation,
utilitarians may find joy in helping an endangered species or pre-
serving bio-diversity. On the cost side, utilitarians may be unhappy
about maintaining inefficient power plants, or they may be un-
happy about tampering with the rivers' natural water temperature.
Whether utilitarians would choose to save the manatees de-
pends on: (1) how much subjective weight each individual gives to
the different factors on both sides of that individual's cost benefit
analysis; and (2) whether individuals who find joy in saving the
manatees outnumber those who find pain doing the same. The
point is that the utilitarian decision-making process is not as clear-
cut or extreme as that of the libertarians or egalitarians. The fol-
lowing table summarizes the three views:
Liberty Happiness ILqu,
Minimalist Calculating cost- Interventionist
night-watchman benefit analyzer micro-manager
No Maybe Yes
III. LEGAL DuTy
Assuming that the egalitarians are right in holding that people
are morally obligated to protect the manatees, does that moral obli-
gation give rise to a legal duty? For the purpose of this discussion,
let us suppose that privatization of the utility industry benefits the
economy but harms the manatees. That being the case, does the
government have a legal duty to save the manatees at the expense
of the economy?
58. For a discussion of the theory that society should maximize pleasure over
pain, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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A. Procedural Duty
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)5 9 urges every
federal agency to use "all practicable means and measures" to ad-
minister federal programs in an environmentally sound manner.60
To this end, NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare an envi-
ronmental impact statement before they carry out any plans that
would significantly impact the environment. 61 The content of this
environmental impact statement should address, inter alia, "any ad-
verse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented."62
In the case of the manatees, before the federal agency in
charge of deregulating the utility industry (Energy Agency) imple-
ments its plans, it must prepare an environmental impact statement
that addresses the fate of the manatees. 63 What if, in the course of
preparing this statement, the Energy Agency finds that deregula-
tion will inevitably lead to the extinction of the manatee? Is the
Agency then required to abandon its deregulation plans? Accord-
59. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1994)) [hereinafter
NEPA].
60. See id. § 101 (A), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (A) (recognizing impact of human activ-
ity on natural environment and declaring that it is government's policy.to maintain
conditions "under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future genera-
tions of Americans"). In the statute, Congress recognized and wished to remedy
man-made environmental problems, such as extreme population growth, indus-
trial expansion, and resource exploitation. See id. It then laid out the goals and
objectives of the governmental environmental policy. See id. §§ 102-05, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4332-35.
61. See id. § 102(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (stating that all agencies of federal
government, when proposing any action, shall include environmental impact
statement).
62. Id. § 102(C) (ii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii). Specifically, the environmental
impact statements shall include:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,
and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id. § 102(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). NEPA also requires that, prior to making the
environmental impact statement, federal officials consult with and obtain com-
ments of corresponding federal agencies that possess jurisdiction by law of special
expertise dealing with the matter at hand. See id.
63. See id. § 102(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (requiring environmental impact
statement for any federal act significantly affecting environment).
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ing to the United States Supreme Court in Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, the answer is no.64 The Court held that NEPA only
forces a federal agency to take a "hard look" at the environmental
consequences of its proposed actions; it does not require the
agency to take substantive actions to protect the environment. 65
Making clear that NEPA is largely procedural, the Court ex-
plained that a federal agency would not have violated NEPA if the
agency, after having complied with NEPA's procedural require-
ments, decided that "the benefits to be derived from downhill ski-
ing . . .justified the issuance of a special use permit, notwith-
standing the loss of 15 percent, 50 percent, or even 100 percent of
[some threatened species]. "66 Applying this rationale to the mana-
tees' case, if the Energy Agency, after having prepared an environ-
mental impact statement, decides that the benefit of lower utility
rates justifies deregulation, then the Energy Agency would be free
to proceed with its deregulation plans, even if 100 percent of the
manatees will perish.
B. Substantive Duty
Fortunately for the manatees, NEPA is not the only source of
statutory protection. The Endangered Species Act (ESA or the
64. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)
(concluding that NEPA does not require agency to prepare either developed plan
describing necessary steps to take to mitigate adverse environmental impacts or
worst case analysis of situation if agency cannot make reasoned assessment of pro-
ject's potential environmental impact). The Forest Service designated a certain
national forest location as having a high potential for development as a downhill
ski resort. See id. at 337. Methow Recreation, Inc., applied for a special use permit
to build such a resort on the location. See id. at 338. The Forest Service then
prepared an environmental impact statement and, based on the statement, "pro-
posed options regarding offsite mitigation measures that might be taken by state
and local governments." Id. at 332, 339-45. The Methow Valley Citizens Council,
among others, brought suit against the Service, claiming that the Forest Service did
not satisfy NEPA's requirements. See id. at 345-46.
65. See id. at 350 (asserting that "[a]lthough these procedures are almost cer-
tain to affect the agency's substantive decision, it is now well settled that NEPA
itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary pro-
cess"). NEPA does not forbid a government agency from determining whether
"other values outweigh environmental costs." Id.
66. Id. at 351 (noting NEPA simply prohibits "uninformed - rather than un-
wise - agency action"). The Court reasoned that since NEPA requires that the
agency prepare the detailed environmental impact statement, this guarantees that
the agency will take a "hard look" at the potential environmental consequences of
the agency's action. See id. at 352. Without the discussion in the environmental
impact statement, "neither the agency nor other interested groups and individuals
can properly evaluate the severity of the adverse effects [of the proposed environ-
mental action]." Id.
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Act) 67 protects endangered species from extinction by making it
unlawful for any person to "take" such species of fish or wildlife.68
The term "take" is defined as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect."69 The Secretary of the Inte-
rior has further defined the word "harm" to include a "significant
67. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 153144 (1994)) [hereinafter ESA].
68. See id. § 9(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). The statute states:
Except as provided in sections 1535(g) (2) and 1539 of this title, with re-
spect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to sec-
tion 1533 of this title it is unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to:
(A) import any such species into, or export any such species from
the United States;
(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial
sea of the United States;
(C) take any such species upon the high seas;
(D) possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any means what-
soever, any such species taken in violation of subparagraphs (B) and (C);
(E) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign
commerce, by any means whatsoever and in the course of a commercial
activity, any such species;
(F) sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any such
species; or
(G) violate any regulation pertaining to such species or to any
threatened species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to authority provided
by this chapter.
Id. This section can be enforced either by federal government action or by a citi-
zen suit. See id. § 11(e) & (g), 42 U.S.C. § 1540(e) & (g); see also Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 177 (1978) (noting that legislative proceedings creat-
ing ESA were "replete with expressions of concern over the risk that might lie in
the loss of any endangered species").
Even though legislation had been enacted prior to the creation of ESA in
1973, species were still being lost at a rate of one per year. See Tennessee Valley
Auth., 437 U.S. at 176. At the time of the Congressional hearings concerning ESA,
Congress had been told:
[M]an and his technology [sic] continued at an ever-increasing rate to
disrupt the natural ecosystem. This has resulted in a dramatic rise in the
number and severity of the threats faced by the world's wildlife. The
truth in this is apparent when one realizes that half of the recorded ex-
tinctions of mammals over the past 2000 years have occurred in the most
recent 50-year period.
Id. (citing Hearings on Endangered Species Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93rd Cong. 202 (1973) (statement of Assistant Secre-
tary of the Interior). Essentially, Congress was concerned about the unknown uses
of endangered species and the "unforeseeable place" such species might have in
the earth's "chain of life." See id. at 178-79; see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1980)
(listing West Indian Manatee as among endangered species).
69. ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (emphasis added). ESA itself does not
further define the term "take" anywhere within the statute. See Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995)
(noting that ESA does not elaborate on definition of "take"). Despite the lack of
additional definitions, ESA does provide that federal agencies must ensure that
none of their activities will jeopardize the existence of endangered species "or re-
sult in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is
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habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breed-
ing, feeding, or sheltering."70 The Supreme Court in Babbit v. Sweet
Home endorsed this particular interpretation of the term "harm."71
The problem with this interpretation of "harm", however, is
that it leaves the term "habitat" undefined. 72 In the manatees' case,
the term "habitat" could have two alternative meanings. "Habitat"
could be defined to mean either (1) the present habitat as it cur-
rently exists or (2) the natural habitat as it existed before human
technology altered it.
If we construe the term "habitat" to mean the present habitat as
it exists now, then ESA would probably prohibit the Energy Agency
from deregulating the utility industry because the act of deregula-
tion would constitute "harm" within the purview of the Act.7 3 De-
regulation may significantly modify the manatees' present habitat
determined by the Secretary . . . to be critical." ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a) (2).
70. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). "Harm" means "an act which actually kills or in-
jures wildlife." Id. Additionally, the term "harass" under ESA's "take" formulation
has been defined as "an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the
likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly
disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to, breed-
ing, feeding, or sheltering." Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp.
1343, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
71. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708. The Supreme Court held that "[t]he
proper interpretation of a term such as 'harm' involves a complex policy choice."
Id. at 708. The Court stated that it was unwilling to substitute its views for those
views of the Secretary of Interior, with whom Congress had entrusted broad discre-
tion. See id. at 707. The Court concluded that, based on ESA's language, structure,
and legislative history, "the Secretary reasonably construed intent of Congress
when he defined 'harm' to include 'significant habitat modification or degrada-
tion that actually kills or injures wildlife.'" Id.
At issue in Sweet Home was the definition of "harm" under ESA's "take" rheto-
ric, "particularly the inclusion of habitat modification and degradation in the defi-
nition." Id. at 692. The respondents in the case were small landowners, logging
companies, and families living in the Pacific Northwest and Southwest, who were
dependent on the forest products and industries located in these areas. See id.
The respondents challenged the meaning of "harm" on its face, specifically stating
that "the red-cockaded woodpecker, an endangered species, and the northern
spotted owl, a threatened species, had injured them economically." Id.
72. See ESA § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (failing to define "habitat"); Sweet Home, 505
U.S. at 708 (failing to define "habitat" and leaving to Secretary of Interior role of
determining what constitutes "harm"); Marbled Murrelet, 880 F. Supp. at 1367 (mak-
ing no clarification of term habitat).
73. See ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). The harm would result from tak-
ing the species by destroying this warm-water habitat. This destruction of the man-
atee environment would result because of the potential closing of power plants
when they are forced out of business by competition after deregulation.
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and thereby adversely impair their present behavioral patterns.7 4
But what if the authors of ESA did not intend the term "habitat" to
include a technologically-altered environment?75
If we were to interpret the term "habitat" to mean the natural
habitat as it once existed, then ESA would probably allow the En-
ergy Agency to deregulate the utility industry. 76 Deregulation
would, in effect, take away the artificial warm-water discharges and
thereby restore the Florida rivers to their natural condition. Which
of these definitions of "habitat" is the desirable one? The answer
depends on just how endangered the manatees are.
By construing the term to mean present habitat, ESA affords the
manatees a short-term protection against abnormally cold winters;
but, in the long run, their dependency on human technology
would place their survival at the mercy of humans. In other words,
the manatees would be weak and domesticated. On the other
hand, by interpreting the term to mean natural habitat, ESA would
remove human technology from nature, which could kill many
manatees in the short-term; however, restoring their habitat to its
natural state would benefit the manatee in the long run. Those
most able to adapt to cold weather would survive and produce a
line of hardy manatees. In short, these manatees would remain
strong and wild.
Therefore, if the population of the manatees is large enough
to survive short-term, cold-related fatalities, then the protective law
should aim to keep wildlife habitats natural. On the other hand, if
the manatees are so endangered that any substantial loss in one
winter season could push them into extinction, then the law should
seek to maintain their present habitat, even if it is a technologically-
altered one.
74. For a discussion of the effect of utility deregulation on the manatee popu-
lation, see supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
75. For purposes of this Article, the term "technologically-altered environ-
ment" denotes an environment that has been altered by human technology to such
an extent that the indigenous life forms therein have substantially modified their
primary behavioral patterns to adapt to the altered environment. For example, if
we construct a garbage dump in a forest, and the local bears become so used to
picking through the garbage that the dump becomes an essential food source for
the bears, then we have substantially modified their primary feeding pattern. The
forest area that surrounds the dump is then a "technologically-altered environ-
ment." But if we build a log cabin in a forest, and the bears do not change their
lifestyle other than to avoid the area surrounding the cabin, then we are not sub-
stantially modifying their primary behavioral patterns. In this case, the forest area
that surrounds the cabin is not a "technologically-altered environment."
76. See ESA § 9(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1). Deregulation would be permit-
ted because it would potentially return the environment to its natural status, thus
undoing the harm created by man-made factories.
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Assuming that the manatees are so close to extinction that
their survival is now dependent upon the thermal technology, how
far will ESA go to preserve their artificial habitat? In Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill,77 the Supreme Court held that ESA creates in all
federal agencies a substantive duty to save endangered species and
that this duty is paramount. 78 There, the Court upheld an injunc-
tion against the completion of a federal dam based on the finding
that if operational, the dam would threaten an endangered species
of fish called the snail darter.79 Even though Congress had already
spent more than $100 million on its construction, and the dam was
essentially ready for operation, the Court nevertheless halted its
completion simply because the operation of the dam would violate
ESA.80
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
Under this "at-all-cost" approach of ESA, regardless of how the
Energy Agency solves its deregulation problem, the Agency would
not be allowed to disturb the thermal effluents. One practical solu-
tion would be to deregulate the power plants subject to the proviso
that the new private owners agree to keep the plants in operation
during unusually harsh winter seasons (the Winter Provision). But
would this Winter Provision pass constitutional muster? Specifi-
cally, would it violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
77. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
78. See id. at 174 (declaring upon "examination of the language, history and
structure of the [ESA] under review here indicates beyond doubt that Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities") (emphasis ad-
ded). The Supreme Court declared that "[tihe plain intent of Congress in enact-
ing this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost." Id. at 184.
79. See id. at 162 (quoting then Secretary of Interior as stating "[t]he pro-
posed impoundment of water behind the proposed Tellico Dam would result in
total destruction of the snail darter's habitat") (emphasis added). The Secretary was
primarily concerned that the completion of the dam would result in destroying
that portion of the Little Tennessee River where the snail darter lived by creating a
reservoir in which the snail darter would be completely inundated. See id. at 161.
80. See id. at 172. The Supreme Court indicated that regardless of the
amount spent on the dam, the explicit provisions of ESA required that construc-
tion be halted because survival of the snail darter was threatened. See id. The
Court additionally noted that "Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, mak-
ing it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording en-
dangered species the highest of priorities, thereby adopting a policy which it
describes as 'institutionalized caution.'" Id. at 194. Moreover, the Court remarked
that it was not its place to preempt congressional action. See id. The Court stated,
"Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality deter-
mined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of
review, nor are we vested with the power of veto." Id. at 194-95.
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A. Eminent Domain
One of the sovereign powers of the government (either state
or federal) is the power of eminent domain.8 1 When the govern-
ment exercises this power, it has the right to take property away
from a private owner, with or without consent.82 The power of emi-
nent domain, however, is not absolute. Upon dispossession, the
government is required to pay the property owner just compensa-
tion. 3 If the government fails to do so, then the seizure amounts to
an unlawful expropriation.
B. Police Power
Another sovereign power of the government is its police
power.84 When a government exercises its police power to regulate
the use of private property for the purpose of protecting public wel-
fare, the regulation usually diminishes the value of the affected
property. Unlike the power of eminent domain, however, when a
government is exercising its police power, the government does not
have to compensate the private owner for his loss. 85
Oftentimes, the line between police power and eminent do-
main is blurred. In these situations, the central issue is whether the
government's police power has become so intrusive that it consti-
tutes an impermissible "taking". Or, as Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes stated, "[t]he general rule at least is, that while property
81. SeeJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTIrrUTIONAL LAW § 11.10
(4th ed. 1991) (stating that "[s]cholars and judges generally classify eminent do-
main as an incidental power and a means of fulfilling other governmental
responsibilities").
82. See id.
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person.., shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §8.4.5 (1997) (stating that "[t]he Supreme
Court has consistently ruled that just compensation is measured in terms of the
loss to the owner; the gain to the taker is irrelevant. Long ago, Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes declared that the measure is 'what has the owner lost, not what the
taker gained'") (citing Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195
(1910)).
84. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 81, § 11.10 (stating that "the term 'po-
lice power' is used to designate the inherent power of the government to take acts
to promote the public health, safety, welfare or morals").
85. See id. (stating that "in the area of eminent domain cases and analysis,
police power' is used more narrowly to designate only the power of government to
regulate the use of land and property without the payment of compensation").
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may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking."8 6
C. Regulatory Taking
The Takings Clause prohibits the government from taking (i.e.
expropriating) private property for public use without compensat-
ing the dispossessed property owner.8 7 With the snail darters, the
Takings Clause did not come into play because the property that
was "taken" for public use was a public one.8 8 With the manatees,
however, the property at issue will be private, thus the Takings
Clause may be pertinent.
In determining whether the Takings Clause applies, we need to
figure out whether the Winter Provision amounts to an exercise of
police power or eminent domain. To make this determination, a
court will usually balance the following five tests.8 9 Note that under
the balancing approach, no single test, in and of itself, is dispositive.
1. Diminution in Value Test
Under the diminution in value test, if the regulation affects a
person's property in such a way that the property can no longer
generate a reasonable economic return, then the regulation
amounts to an impermissible taking.90 Applying this test to the
86. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice
Holmes additionally stated that "[tihe protection of private property in the Fifth
Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall
not be taken for such use without compensation." Id. He also pointed out that a
similar presumption is made in decisions regarding the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id.
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (noting "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation") (emphasis added).
88. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 157 (1978) (acknowledg-
ing that "public use" can also mean saving endangered species). The Supreme
Court allowed the taking because the property "taken" was already public property
being used for the construction of a federal dam. See id.
89. See Pennsylvania Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 121 (1978)
(providing that whether there was denial of substantive due process turns on
whether restrictions deprived property owner of reasonable return).
90. See Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413. The Supreme Court's decision
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. stands for the proposition that all property is subject to the
sovereign power of the State if that property threatens the life, health, or safety of
the public. See id. at 405. Determining that in ordinary private affairs the public
interest does not warrant interference, the Court stated:
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone.
One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of
diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases
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manatees' case, if compliance with the Winter Provision costs more
than earnings derived from running the power plant, then the Win-
ter Provision constitutes an illegal taking. Whether the cost of com-
plying with the Winter Provision will exceed the plant's revenue
depends on the pace of scientific progress.
If science has progressed to the point where electricity can be
generated more cheaply and cleanly, without employing river water
to cool the power plant, then it would not be reasonable to force a
power plant to use antiquated and costly technology during unusu-
ally cold winter seasons. But if science has yet to advance beyond
the existing pass-through-cooling system, then requiring the plant
to remain in operation is reasonable. This is so because, at the
same level of technology, the operating cost of running the plant
during unusually cold winter months will not deviate much from
the average year-round operating cost. In short, a plant is not likely
to lose money during the winter months; it will just make a smaller
profit.
2. Reciprocity of Advantage Test
Applying the reciprocity of advantage test, if the property
owner benefits from the regulation, then the regulation is more
likely to be a valid exercise of the government's police power than
an impermissible taking.91 In the manatees' case, whether a power
plant owner will benefit from the Winter Provision depends on how
enterprising the owner is. For example, an owner could build an
observation deck near the plant and charge tourists an admission
fee for the opportunity to watch manatees congregate in unnatu-
rally large numbers. If the revenue from this undertaking exceeds
its cost, then the owner benefits from the Winter Provision. In that
instance, the Winter Provision would be a valid exercise of police
power.
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sus-
tain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts.
Id. at 413. The Court continued by stating that, even though the legislature re-
ceives the greatest weight in rendering its decisions, the public always has the op-
tion to contend that the legislature has exceeded the bounds of its constitutional
power in performing the taking. See id.
91. See Pennsylvania Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25 (acknowledging Court's dismis-
sals of previous takings challenges on grounds that, although government action
caused injury, it did not interfere with property owners' interests that were con-
nected to reasonable expectations of property under Fifth Amendment); see also
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) (holding that interest
in high-water level of river for runoff of tailwaters to maintain power is not
property).
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Again, the advancement of science plays an important role. If
a technological paradigm-shift occurs in the near future, and the
resulting new technology dramatically reduces the cost of produc-
ing electricity such that the savings from switching to this new tech-
nology is greater than the tourism profit, then the plant owner will
not derive an advantage from the Winter Provision. In that case,
the Winter Provision would constitute an impermissible taking.
3. Investment-Backed Expectations Test
Under the investment-backed expectations test, if (1) an owner
expects to derive some sort of economic gain from his property, (2)
the owner backs this expectation up with investments, and (3) the
regulation interferes with his expectation, then the court is likely to
find an unconstitutional taking. 92 In the manatees' case, when the
Energy Agency auctions off the power plants to prospective pur-
chasers, the purchasers would have received notice that the sale is
subject to the Winter Provision. In that case, the buyers would have
figured the cost of complying with the Winter Provision into their
expectations of economic gain. Accordingly, the informed pur-
chasers cannot later complain about interference with their profit
expectations.
Unlike the previous tests, scientific progress does not play a
role here. It is true that the deregulation of the utility industry is
still several years away, and the aforementioned technological para-
digm-shift could take place at any time.93 Regardless of the form of
technology that the prospective buyers eventually invest in, how-
ever, the cost of implementing the Winter Provision would still be
part of their calculation. The only difference is that before the par-
adigm-shift, the cost of complying with the Winter Provision is rela-
tively low, but after the shift, the cost may be high.
4. Harm-Benefit Test
Under the harm-benefit test, if the underlying purpose of the
regulation is to protect the public from harm, then the regulation is
probably an exercise of legitimate police power. If, however, the
purpose is to extract a public benefit, then the regulation probably
92. See Hadachek v. Sebastian, 289 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1915) (commenting that
justification for prohibition resulted from state's interest regarding health and
comfort of community).
93. See Nollan v. California Coastal Community, 483 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1987)
(remarking that placing condition on property rights through police power must
involve substantial state interest).
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constitutes an illegal taking.9 4 In the manatees' case, the goal of
the Winter Provision is to protect the manatees from extinction by
preserving their habitat. If conservation of endangered species is
beneficial to society, then the Winter Provision serves to extract a
public benefit, and the Winter Provision would constitute an illegal
taking. This conclusion remains the same regardless of whether
the technological paradigm-shift occurs.
5. Conditional Nexus Test
Under the conditional nexus test, if a regulation imposes an
extraneous economic cost as a condition to carrying on the eco-
nomic activity, then the court will apply an intensified judicial scru-
tiny to the regulation's justification. 95 For the regulation to be a
justifiable exercise of police power, a nexus must exist between
what the regulation is trying to extract from the owner on one
hand, and what public interest the regulation seeks to serve on the
other.96 In other words, (1) the objective must serve a legitimate
public interest, and (2) the means must substantially advance the
objective. 9 7
The Winter Provision should have little problem passing the
intensified judicial review given that (1) the objective of saving the
manatees serves a legitimate public interest and (2) the means (i.e.,
requiring the owners to keep the plant running during unusually
cold winters) substantially advance this objective. Regardless of
whether a technological paradigm-shift takes place or not, saving
94. See id. at 838 (explaining that conditions and regulations placed on prop-
erty must reasonably relate to public need or burden). The Court in Nollan faced
the issue of whether the California Coastal Commission could condition the issu-
ance of a building permit for a house on a beachfront lot on the builders' transfer-
ring to the public an easement across their beachfront property. See id. at 827. In
resolving the issue, the Court held that such a condition was constitutionally pro-
tected and allowable so long as the regulation "substantially advance[d] [a] legiti-
mate state interest." Id. at 834.
95. See id. (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (recognizing
that land-use regulation "does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance [s] le-
gitimate state interests' and does not 'deny an owner economically viable use of his
land"').
96. See id. at 834. The case does not clarify the standards for determining
what constitutes a legitimate state interest or what type of connection between the
regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirements. See id. It is clear, how-
ever, that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations can satisfy the
requirements. See id. at 834-35.
97. See id. at 834 n.3 (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (noting that Supreme
Court has not outlined standard for what constitutes substantially advancing legiti-
mate state interests).
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the manatees is still a legitimate public interest, and keeping their
habitats safe and warm would still advance this objective.
6. Balancing the Five Tests
Looking at all five tests in toto, it appears that scientific progress
plays a decisive role in determining the outcome. If the technologi-
cal paradigm-shift does not occur before the deregulation, then a
court is likely to uphold the Winter Provision as a legitimate exer-
cise of police power. If a technological breakthrough occurs, how-
ever, then the court is likely to strike down the Winter Provision as
an impermissible taking.
This conclusion is vulnerable to criticism because it assumes
that each test carries an equal weight. According to the doctrine of
legal realism, a judicial outcome is determined by the sociological,
psychological and political makeup of the individual judge.98 If this
doctrine is correct, then the amount of weight attached to each test
could vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In any event, if the government is determined to privatize the
utility industry and wishes to avoid any specter of a takings problem,
the government could always impose a special manatee tax under
which the revenue would be given to the plant owners as just com-
pensation. Whether people would vote in favor of such a tax de-
pends on their view of moral obligation.
V. CONCLUSION
Where technology has altered the natural environment to such
an extent that the survival of an indigenous species has become de-
pendent on the man-made habitat, do we have a duty to maintain
the existence of that technology? If we are talking about moral ob-
ligation, then there is no objective answer to this question. But if
we are talking about legal duty, then the answer is yes. The extent
to which the law may reach to maintain the technologically-altered
environment, however, is limited by constitutional considerations.
As we have seen, constitutional considerations, in turn, are deter-
mined by the state of scientific advancement.
98. SeeJEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 46-52 (1963) (providing
judicial outcome results from law which depending on situation "is either (a) ac-
tual law, i.e., a specific past decision, as to that situation, or (b) probably law, i.e., a
guess as to a specific future decision").
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